After 22 years in the British army, which included a tour in Afghanistan, Ed Macy was eager to begin civilian life, but because of a shortage of experienced weapons officers on the Apache AH Mk.1, he was recalled. In 2007, as part of an effort to contain a resurgent Taliban, Macy was sent on a raid on Taliban headquarters in the Helmand province, farther south than any British troops had ever been.
Lieutenant Colonel Rob Magowan’s battle group mapped the Taliban main supply route from Pakistan, locating five staging areas where fighters and supplies were concentrated. These became the primary targets for the Army Air Corps’ Operation Glacier. Macy’s company, the 656 Squadron, Apache helicopter company—call sign “Ugly”—was tasked with destroying the route, beginning with a site near the village of Koshtay and moving steadily north. The success of the first raid paved the way for the second part of Operation Glacier.
The following excerpt is from Apache, by Ed Macy (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2009). In a few instances, names of individuals have been changed to protect their safety.
For the first time the taliban were on the defensive. The brigadier wanted to keep it that way. The Royal Marines had taken a pasting from the Taliban in the three months since they’d arrived in September 2006. Now we’d given a bit of the pasting back. The order came down to launch Operation Glacier 2 as soon as possible.
The mission was to destroy the Taliban’s main forward operating base in southern Helmand. It was a giant, high-walled rectangular compound, 200 meters long by 100 wide [220 by 110 yards], on the banks of the Helmand River where the Green Zone borders the Desert of Death in the west. It was extremely well fortified, with stone and adobe walls 10 feet high and three feet thick, and guard towers at each of its four corners. It was known locally as the Jugroom Fort.
The assault would be done by the 120 Royal Marines of Zulu Company, 45 Commando, with supporting fire from 105-mm light guns and the Scimitar armored vehicles of C Squadron, the Light Dragoons.
Colonel Magowan, commander of an intelligence unit, planned the operation, and it was an excellent one.
First, the place would be pummeled relentlessly with a massive bombardment from fast air and artillery. It would begin at midnight and last for four hours. An incredible total of 100,000 pounds of bombs dropped by B-1s would test the Taliban’s resolve. If they still wanted to stay around and defend it after that, the fort would be every bit as significant as the colonel thought.
Then, at 4 a.m., he would launch a ground assault, move into the fort, and effectively plant an International Security Assistance Force flag on its ramparts—a red flag to the Taliban’s raging bull. They would counter-attack with all available manpower—probably with their trademark encirclement maneuver. Zulu Company would then withdraw swiftly just before dawn—leaving the Taliban fully exposed. Magowan’s pièce de résistance would be to send in the Apaches (call signs Ugly Five Two and Ugly Five Three) to pick them off and identify any hidden bunkers they attempted to escape into, so fast air could close them down—forever.
We were flying the Westland WAH-64 Apache, a British modification of the Boeing Apache Longbow equipped with two 2,100-shaft-horsepower Rolls-Royce engines. Most impressive of all the Apache’s cutting-edge technology was how it found its prey. Its Target Acquisition and Designation Sight system (TADS) was made up of an array of cameras housed in a double-headed nose cone that looked like a pair of giant insect eyes. At night, the thermal camera was so powerful it could identify a human form from a distance of four kilometers [2.5 miles], and spots of blood on the ground from a kilometer up.
The TADS monocle sat permanently over a pilot’s right iris, and a dozen different instrument readings from around the cockpit were projected into it. At the flick of a button, a range of other images could also be superimposed underneath the green glow of the instrument symbology, replicating the TADS’ camera images and the Longbow Radars’ targets.
The monocle left the pilot’s left eye free to look outside the cockpit, saving him the few seconds that it took to look down at the instruments, then up again—seconds that could mean the difference between our death and our enemy’s. New pilots suffered terrible headaches as the left and right eye competed for dominance. They started within minutes, long before takeoff. If you admitted to them, the instructor grounded you immediately—so none of us ever did.
As the eyes adjusted over the following weeks and months, the headaches took longer to set in. It was a year before mine disappeared altogether. During a sortie I once filmed my face with a video camera as an experiment. My eyes whirled independently of each other throughout, like a man possessed.
“That’s disgusting,” my wife Emily said when I showed her the tape. “But does it mean you can read two books at once?”
I tried it. I could.
I would remain behind, stationed at the base as part of the incident response team. Judging by the amount of stuff they were going to be chucking at Op Glacier 2’s target before the assault, we reckoned that there was only a slim chance that the four of us would have anything to do with it.
But at 7:05 a.m., the radio crackled into action. In 20 seconds we were in the Ops room. The watchkeeper was waiting for us.
“It’s a casualty evacuation, guys. A single Apache to protect a CH-47 down to Garmsir.” He gave me a grid with the Chinook’s landing site.
“How many casualties?”
“Five.”
That wasn’t good. They shouldn’t be taking casualties more than three hours after the ground assault was supposed to have gone in.
“Why aren’t the two Apaches down there going to protect the CH-47?”
“They’re busy fighting.”
The Taliban weren’t giving up Jugroom Fort without a fight.


Comments
So...where's the rest of the story? EDITORS' REPLY: In the book from which this article was excerpted: Apache, by Ed Macy (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2009).
Posted by TJ2000 on July 20,2009 | 08:32AM
I hope that the Smithsonian is getting a piece of the pie for publishing this excerpt because y'all just sold a load of these books just now! Thanks for this article. EDITORS' REPLY: We're not, but we're glad for the interest.
Posted by Mike Burkholder on July 20,2009 | 08:22PM
What an amazing story, I can't wait to go pick up the book!
Posted by BigWill on July 23,2009 | 09:22AM
GROAN! What a cliff hanger... Cruel, cruel you are A&S Mag!
Posted by Mark Hanneman on July 23,2009 | 10:26AM
I've read the book and it is great.You can also see footage of the rescue on youtube. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=04XIPyWTzvw http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x6qHcd4imKk or just try 'apache rescue'. I had a couple of late nights because i just couldn't put it down.
Posted by D. Washington on July 29,2009 | 01:49AM
jajaja... this is like when you go to the supermarket and they give you a cookie to taste... but very good article indeed.
Posted by federico trejos on July 29,2009 | 12:08PM
ON THE PICTURE CAPTION: "The labor-intensive helicopter requires 32 hours of maintenance for every hour flown — and a ground crew of 98." I don't know the exact maint hours of the AH-64 but 32 hrs/flight hr doesn't make any sense at all. In multiple industry internet postings about a newer upgrade of the AH-64, the Longbow version is said to "require one third less maintenance man hours (3.4) per flight hour" than the AH-64A. That sounds like the AH-64A needs something like 10.2 hrs per flight hour, and the Longbow just 6.8. On the ground crew number: There are around 900 Apaches in the Army. That means it would take 88,200 of the total 1,097,050 soldiers in the entire US army just to repair the Apaches. That doesn't make any sense. I think it's more like 3-4 ground crew. EDITORS' REPLY: Our information comes from Ed Macy's book, page 45: “[The Apache] needed thirty-two man hours of maintenance on the ground for every hour flown—and that wasn’t just a couple of hairy-arsed blokes in boiler suits sharing a wrench. Our Apaches needed REME avionics and airframe technicians, armourers, arming and loading teams, drivers, refuellers, signallers, IT specialists, Intelligence officers, clerks and storemen—ninety-eight people in total.”
Posted by Steve on August 24,2009 | 01:15AM
What a great excerpt! and what a cruel trick not to tell us the end. (Maybe a future article?) Oh well, another book to add to my collection.
Posted by JCO on August 26,2009 | 09:07AM
Hi all. I would like to thank Air & Space for printing this excerpt and the editor for replying to your questions. Steve (August24,2009|01:15AM These are the true figures and while they are dropping slightly and continually, I would like to explain why your figures do add up, but don't add up in reality. The editor replied by inserting the part of the book where I explain who works on our Apaches and how many maintenance hours are spent on them. The UK has 67 Apaches in total. Some of them are in storage (spares) and a lot of them are in deep maintenance because we fly the ass of them. We have a small pool of Apaches flying at Wattisham to keep the pilots ready for Afghanistan and a handful at our Apache flying school in Middle Wallop. The ones at Wallop are maintained by civilians and that frees up the Army technicians and groundcrew. For the relatively small numbers we actually operate, we did maintain those aircraft at that maintenance rate, but as the editor correctly said, these are not all technicians. The man hours quoted are technical hours spent on the Apache while on the ground in Afghanistan; that’s REME avionics and airframe technicians. 98 men are what an Apache Sqn has in it (Less than 50% are technicians). Each Sqn has only one goal and that’s to keep Apaches in the air. That is not 98 men for every Apache, but 98 men for every Sqn of 8 Apaches. There is only a single Sqn in Afghanistan and we only have a handful of Sqn’s in Wattisham. Hopefully the maths on the numbers of men required should drop dramatically now?
Posted by Ed Macy on September 30,2009 | 02:59AM